By DUNCAN MCCARGO
Published: December 19, 2013
In fact, the protesters themselves are proving Mr. Anek wrong. Now it’s
the urban middle classes who are being manipulated by wayward
politicians — like Suthep Thaugsuban, a former deputy prime minister who
resigned from Parliament last month to lead the demonstrations — and
who oppose holding fresh elections. And it’s the voters from the
countryside who are backing electoral democracy.
Most administrations have traditionally comprised unstable coalitions of
warring factions, which means the traditional elites in the military,
the royal palace and the judiciary called most of the shots because they
could bring down prime ministers at will. Monarchism is to Thailand
what Kemalism is to Turkey: a founding principle that the military can
always invoke to justify seizing power on grounds of national security.
At least that was the case until 2001, when Thaksin Shinawatra, Ms.
Yingluck’s older brother, won his first election, paving the way for the
victory of pro-Thaksin parties in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2011. An upstart
Chiang Mai police officer turned telecommunications magnate and then
political hustler, Mr. Thaksin is a controversial and polarizing figure.
He was ousted in a military coup in 2006. Now in exile abroad, he faces
jail time should he return home. Yet he has managed to consolidate
power in the hands of a dominant ruling party, which has survived two
court-mandated dissolutions and other judicial challenges.
Thailand’s oldest political party, the Democrat Party, last won an
election in 1992; its conservative, pro-bureaucracy bases in Bangkok and
the south are not big enough for it to secure a national majority. And
this very sore loser is now playing a central role in trying to oust an
elected government. Its members have resigned from Parliament and joined
the demonstrators who are calling for an end to the broader “Thaksin
regime” and claiming that pro-Thaksin politicians have been buying rural
voters.
But the protesters are failing to grasp that the Shinawatra family is
simply the astute beneficiary of seismic changes in Thailand’s political
economy. Although money undoubtedly plays a role in all Thai elections,
Mr. Thaksin, Ms. Yingluck and their parties have built up a huge and
genuine following, especially in the very populous northern and
northeastern parts of the country.
Full-time farmers hardly exist in these regions any more. They have
become urbanized villagers: provincials only on paper, who have migrated
to work in greater Bangkok but vote in their home provinces. General
elections in Thailand are now determined by some 16 million or more
urbanized villagers, who make up around a third of the total electorate.
Urbanized villagers have incomes not much lower than their urban
middle-class counterparts, but they are often in debt, have insecure
employment and have to work more than one job. Unlike the villagers of
old, they are not interested in subsistence agriculture; they want to
enjoy the benefits of consumer society and send their children to
university. Like most Democrat Party supporters, they dream of
socio-economic advancement, yet for more than a decade, the pro-Thaksin
parties have locked in their support with populist policies such as
subsidized healthcare programs and village-development funds to promote
small businesses.
The current antigovernment protests in Bangkok are the last gasp of Thai dynastic paternalism. They reflect the determination of the old elite and its middle-class allies to check the rising power of the formerly rural electorate by bringing down the Yingluck administration. They are calling for the creation of a “people’s assembly,” an unelected temporary governing body representing different occupational groups that would oversee a process of political reform — in effect, a dictatorship of the capital over the rest of the country.
The protests are taking place in a climate of growing national anxiety.
This nervousness has several sources: fears about royal succession, as
the long reign of King Bhumibol Adulyadej approaches its twilight; fears
about secession, as one of the world’s worst insurgencies by
Malay-Muslim separatists continues to rage in the southern provinces;
fears about alienation, as pro-Thaksin groups have established thousands
of “red-shirt villages” in the increasingly psychologically isolated
north and northeast — and above all, fears among Bangkok’s middle
classes about being outvoted by low-class urbanized villagers.
It was all so unnecessary. Just a few weeks ago, Ms. Yingluck was
governing Thailand with the tacit support of the military and the
monarchy. Her government had numerous failings, but for two and a half
years there had been no serious political protests and the country’s
deep divisions had been largely papered over.
A new pact among the pro-Thaksin and pro-royalist elites is urgently
needed. This time, however, it should be broadened to engage the wider
public. More urbanized villagers should be allowed to register to vote
in and around Bangkok. Power should be decentralized in favor of the
provinces, with some form of autonomy granted to the troubled south.
Instead of occupying ministry buildings in Bangkok, the Democrats would
do well to make serious attempts to woo provincial voters. Urbanized
villagers cannot be wished away by the Bangkok elites; they rightly
expect to share the benefits of Thailand’s remarkable economic success.
When they no longer are treated as underdogs, their pragmatic ties with
pro-Thaksin parties will wither — and Thailand will stop being two
democracies and become one unified nation.